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Abstract
Despite vast research in adversarial examples, the root
causes of model susceptibility are not well understood. In-
stead of looking at attack-specific robustness, we propose
a notion that evaluates the sensitivity of individual neurons
in terms of how robust the model’s output is to direct per-
turbations of that neuron’s output. Analyzing models from
this perspective reveals distinctive characteristics of stan-
dard as well as adversarially-trained robust models, and
leads to several curious results. In our experiments on
CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, we find that attacks using a loss
function that targets just a single sensitive neuron find ad-
versarial examples nearly as effectively as ones that target
the full model. We analyze the properties of these sensitive
neurons to propose a regularization term that can help a
model achieve robustness to a variety of different perturba-
tion constraints while maintaining accuracy on natural data
distributions. Code for all our experiments is available at
https:// github.com/ iamgroot42/ sauron.
1. Introduction
Since the discovery of adversarial examples [2, 5, 15],
there have been many attempts at designing defences [9,
20], synthesizing new attacks that break existing de-
fences [17], and attempts at understanding the underlying
phenomena behind this susceptibility [10]. Although re-
cent work has helped reduce computational overheads while
training for robustness [11, 13, 18], known methods also in-
cur significant drops in performance on benign data. More-
over, robustness to a specific adversary is not very useful
against an adaptive adversary. Simultaneous robustness to
different types of Lp bounded perturbations (e.g., L∞ and
L1) is, in fact, impossible to achieve in simple statistical
settings [16]. Observations on actual datasets and machine-
learning models further reinforce claims of some perturba-
tion types being mutually exclusive.
Our work is based on the premise that analyzing the in-
herent robustness properties of a model can help demystify
adversarial susceptibility, and perhaps even lead to meth-
ods for improving robustness. A few recent works have at-
tempted to identify and remedy ‘sensitive’ neurons that acti-
vate more frequently on perturbed inputs [12, 19, 21]. How-
ever, all these works assume a Projected Gradient Descent
(PGD) [9] attack constrained by particular Lp perturbations.
Moreover, like most adversarial defences, they suffer drops
in overall accuracy. An ideal measure of model robustness
should not make strong assumptions about the adversary.
Although some recent work research with latent-space per-
turbations [3, 22] study adversary-agnostic attacks, the per-
turbations are either unconstrained in the input space, not
guaranteed to trigger misclassification, or cannot be directly
extended to classification models.
Contributions. We propose a new approach to study the
inherent robustness of a machine learning model: instead
of looking at performance against a given adversarial in-
put (forward direction), we look at the impact of a neuron’s
output on the model’s output to quantify its adversarial sen-
sitivity (reverse direction). This notion of neuron sensitivity
allows each neuron’s sensitivity to be measured in terms of
how much the output value of that neuron can change with-
out changing the model’s classification (Section 2). Since
this definition relates to a neuron’s output, it is independent
of particular attacks, and thus, has advantages over previous
definitions based on limiting input perturbations. Our ex-
perimental results with single-neuron attacks (Section 2.2)
show that the proposed sensitivity measure is related to the
adversarial susceptibility of a model.
Further, we propose a regularization term to minimize
neuron sensitivity (Section 3) and show that we can train a
robust model using this additional loss term, without com-
promising on accuracy on clean data. Models trained with
the proposed loss term are not only simultaneously robust
to multiple perturbation families, but incur minimal compu-
tational overhead: training with this term is nearly as fast
as regular training. This does not result in state-of-the-art
robustness but suggests that our notion of sensitivity cor-
relates with adversarial susceptibility, and approaches that
analyze and train for robustness at the level of individual
neurons are a promising direction for both deepening our
understanding and generating more robust models.
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2. Neuron Sensitivity
Consider a deep neural network, D, designed for a clas-
sification problem. For a neuron identified by i, we define
the sensitivity for that neuron for an input x as:
Definition 2.1 (Neuron Sensitivity). We define the sensitiv-
ity, ∆, of neuron i for an input x as the minimum perturba-
tion to the neuron’s output that results in a misclassification:
∆(i, x) = argmin
δ
{ |δ| | D(x) , D˜iδ(x)} (1)
where D˜iδ corresponds to a modified network that adds per-
turbation δ to the output of neuron i.
We posit that this notion of sensitivity can help capture
the inherent robustness of a model and not just robustness
against specific adversaries. Throughout the paper, we re-
fer to these sensitivities as ∆-values: a higher ∆-value im-
plies lower sensitivity, as a larger perturbation is required on
that neuron’s output for misclassification. Since an adver-
sarial input is supposed to cause considerable changes in the
model’s output for a slightly perturbed input, these changes
must stem from internal outputs of the model itself, which
we aim to capture via our definition of sensitivity. We use a
summary statistic for sensitivities to define an ordering over
neurons. Additionally, we can use these sensitivities to craft
adversarial inputs (Section 2.2).
2.1. Identifying Sensitive Neurons
Analyzing the sensitivity of neurons corresponding to
the logits layer is a good starting point since it has an easy
closed-form solution. The inputs to the logits layer can be
considered as feature representations, z(x), learned by the
model [7]. Let the class of a given input x be y, l(x) be
the corresponding logits, and W be the logits-layer weight
matrix. Then, the sensitivity of neuron i for input x is:
∆(i, x) =
l(x)[y] − l(x)[yˆ]
W[i, yˆ] −W[i, y] (2)
Interpreting inputs to the logits layer as features learned by
the model, these sensitivity values have an interesting in-
terpretation as a measure inversely related to how robust the
model’s output is to slight changes in specific features. In an
ideal scenario, no single feature should have too much influ-
ence over the model’s classification output. The ideal clas-
sifier should learn redundant features that are independent
yet highly correlated, given the input’s actual class. Such
a solution is intuitive as well: tires in an airplane can eas-
ily fool a classifier for CIFAR-10 [8] that learns to give very
high importance to the presence of tires for vehicles, or eyes
that resemble tires. Focusing on the sensitivity of neurons is
a step towards achieving this goal of truly-robust learning.
Figure 1. Distribution of scaled neuron sensitivities for VGG-19
models trained normally (blue), with adversarial training using an
L∞ PGD adversary (orange), and with the proposed regulariza-
tion term (green) on CIFAR-10. Histograms are smoothed with a
Gaussian Kernel, with Scott Kernel-size estimation.
As an illustration of the potential value of our sensitiv-
ity definition, Figure 1 shows the distribution of ∆-values
over the neurons for three different VGG-19 [14] models.
Both the standard and adversarially-trained models follow
similar distributions: the majority of neurons have moder-
ate ∆-values, and most of them are quite low, which can
be exploited by an adversary since it would target the most
sensitive neurons. In Section 3, we introduce a training reg-
ularization term motivated by our sensitivity definition that
produces the “sensitivity-trained” model, with a distribution
where nearly all neurons have high ∆-values.
2.2. Neuron Sensitivity Attacks
Since it is possible to compute ∆-values for neurons in
the last layer, we consider methods for finding adversarial
examples considering only a single neuron. We consider an
adversary that wishes to maximize the attack success rate
(adversary successfully changes model’s prediction) for the
inputs that they craft. Moreover, empirically measuring at-
tack success rates for neurons with different ∆-values can
help establish a correlation between neuron sensitivity and
adversarial susceptibility. Using the sensitivity of a neuron
i in the logits layer for input x, we can define a loss function
to find adversarial inputs x
′
that minimizes:∥∥∥D(x′ ) − D˜i∆(i,x)(x)∥∥∥2 (3)
We then solve for x
′
with constrained optimization: using
a Lagrangian multiplier formulation with gradient descent.
The adversary may even use PGD to incorporate perturba-
tion budgets in the input space. Since this attack is easily
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Figure 2. Attack success rates for single-neuron attacks targeting
different neurons, ordered by increasing ∆(i, x) for each input seed
x, for an L∞( = 8255 ) constrained adversary. Dashed lines repre-
sent attack success rates using standard PGD attack.
parallelizable across target neurons, it is feasible for the ad-
versary to target multiple features in the logits layer.
Through our experiments, we observe interesting (and
sometimes surprising) correlations between the sensitivity-
based ordering of neurons and success rates of the proposed
attack, as shown in Figure 2. Each index on the x-axis repre-
sents picking the ith neuron for each input x, when ordered
by ∆(i, x). For both the adversarially-trained robust mod-
els, there is a range where we see a strong correlation of
the relationship we expected: attack success rates (percent-
age of seeds for which adversary finds a successful adver-
sarial example) drop with increasing ∆-values. Beyond a
certain point (∼400 out of 512 neurons), the attack success
rates stop following any comprehensible patterns. This is
because those neurons correspond to features with close to
zero variance throughout the dataset. Thus, by definition,
such neurons have ∆-values that are unlikely to be reached
by any input. Nonetheless, using those ∆-values as an ob-
jective helps the adversary successfully find examples that
trigger misclassifications.
To further improve attacks, an adversary can use multi-
ple (n, hyper-parameter) target neurons and run the single-
neuron attack on each one of them independently. If any one
of these succeeds, we count this as a successful n-neuron at-
tack. As evident from Table 1, even a single neuron attack
achieves non-trivial attack success rates against all models
and trying the top 16 neurons approaches the success rate of
full PGD. It is not surprising that this attack is not as suc-
cessful as PGD: it targets only one neuron at a time and is
thus not expected to be not as powerful. Nonetheless, the
fact that targeting just a handful of neurons works is useful
for finding adversarial examples seems surprising.
3. Training for Minimal Sensitivity
Our initial motivation for this work was the belief that it
might be possible to prune sensitive neurons to help with
robustness. However, we found that there is no amount
of pruning that improves robustness while maintaining any
classification accuracy. Pruning just 20% of the most sen-
sitive (lowest average ∆(i, x) over training-set inputs) fea-
tures leads to 9% and 3% absolute drops in accuracy and
robustness, respectively. We observed this trend for stan-
dard models as well as models trained with an adversarial
loss. However, pruning neurons with high ∆-values does not
impact robustness or accuracy significantly: dropping out
nearly 50% of the model’s features makes nearly no differ-
ence (which could be explained by redundancy [1]). These
observations are in contradiction to the view of ‘robust’ and
‘useful’ features proposed by Madry et al. [7]. Since an ad-
hoc “patch” to help with robustness does not seem to help,
we consider the alternative of constructing a loss function
around the sensitivity of neurons.
As single-neuron attack success rates seem correlated
with ∆-values, one possible way to help with robustness
against such attacks is to maximize the minimum ∆-value
across neurons. Since a simple solution for ∆-values ex-
ists only for the last layer, a straightforward form of such a
regularization term is:
1
n
n∑
i=1
1
|Y | − 1
∑
yˆ,yi
max
j∈F
∣∣∣∣∣∆( j, xi) − µ jσ j
∣∣∣∣∣ (4)
where µ j and σ j are the mean and standard deviation of z j,
|Y | is the number of classes, and F is the set of features.
However, directly using this loss can lead to degenerate so-
lutions since the model tends to just blow up the logits or
make weight values extremely small in order to minimize
this objective. Hence, we use a reduced version of the sen-
sitivity regularization term:
λ1
k(|Y | − 1)
maxk∑
j
∑
l,i
|w[ j, yi] − w[ j, yl]|
+
λ2
k
maxk∑
j
∣∣∣∣ z(xi)[ j](w[ j, yi] − w[ j, yˆ])∑ z(xi)
∣∣∣∣ (5)
The first term encourages the model not to give very high
importance to any specific feature for a particular class. The
second term encourages the model to ensure that no single
feature has a high relative contribution to an input’s corre-
sponding logits. Summation over the top k neurons helps
gradients flow through more neurons, compared to focus-
ing on just the maximum. Although using either of these
terms individually gives non-trivial robustness (∼60% L2
3
Normal L2 Attack success rates L∞ Attack success rates
Model Accuracy PGD 1-NS 4-NS 8-NS 16-NS PGD 1-NS 4-NS 8-NS 16-NS
C
IF
A
R
-1
0 Standard 93.0 97.8 33.0 71.7 93.1 97.7 99.9 34.1 74.9 96.6 99.9
L2-Robust 86.7 34.8 9.4 23.0 28.4 31.8 71.2 13.3 38.4 50.8 66.7
L∞-Robust 78.3 34.4 12.5 24.4 29.8 33.1 50.7 15.7 33.2 41.2 47.9
Sensitivity 92.9 40.8 15.1 36.0 42.7 45.5 49.5 27.4 56.9 64.6 66.9
Im
ag
eN
et Standard 76.1 99.9 96.1 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 98.1 100 100 100
L2 Robust 57.9 58.3 30.4 48.1 46.0 47.3 66.5 34.9 48.1 50.8 52.4
L∞ Robust 62.4 85.8 53.3 68.3 71.9 74.3 62.3 31.9 44.4 47.4 48.6
Table 1. Accuracies and attack success rates using PGD (100 iterations, 20 restarts) and neuron sensitivity attacks for L2 ( = 0.5 for
CIFAR10,  = 3.0 for ImageNet) and L∞ ( = 8255 for CIFAR10,
4
255 for ImageNet) perturbation constraints, for VGG-19 trained on
CIFAR10 and Resnet-50 [6] trained on Imagenet [4]. The k-NS attack is the attack independently targeting the top-k neurons, ranked by
∆-sensitivity.
PGD attack success rate), combining them has a substantial
positive effect, lowering attack success rates significantly.
We wish to understand further the complementary nature of
these two terms in future work.
We incorporate (5) in the training optimization proce-
dure. Since this is just a regularization term, it is nearly as
fast as regular training. Our experiments show that training
with this additional term results in a model that is simulta-
neously robust to multiple perturbations. Moreover, it does
not compromise accuracy on normal inputs (Table 1). In-
terestingly, our model has higher robustness against an L∞
adversary than a model trained with an adversarial loss ex-
clusively against the L∞ adversary. The proposed loss term
is supposed to lower neuron sensitivity which, as we em-
pirically show in our experiments, is correlated with robust-
ness. Training with the proposed additional loss does not
produce state-of-the-art robustness. Nonetheless, it is en-
couraging as it (a) does not lead to a drop in accuracy, and
(b) provides multi-adversary robustness.
In addition to our robustness results, we observe encour-
aging trends in the weight and feature distributions of the
model. As visible in Figure 3, adversarial training zeroes
out more feature activations than regular training. On the
other hand, training for sensitivity leads to nearly all neu-
rons having non-zero activations. Multiple possible expla-
nations could potentially explain this phenomenon, and we
are optimistic that further work in this direction will yield
improvements in the general understanding of adversarial
robustness and insights for better training methods.
4. Conclusions
We propose a new way to analyze the inherent robust-
ness of a DNN model. Our experiments show that studying
the sensitivity of neurons in a way that is agnostic to in-
put perturbations can be useful for understanding adversar-
ial robustness. Our notion of neuron sensitivity has interest-
Figure 3. Scaled feature activation (min-max scaling) values for
VGG-19 models trained normally (blue), with adversarial train-
ing (orange), and with the proposed regularization term (green) on
CIFAR-10.
ing correlations with adversarial robustness. Additionally, it
can be used to find adversarial examples with attack success
rates close to PGD attacks. Additionally, a model trained
with a regularization to control neuron sensitivity helps with
robustness to multiple types of perturbations, without com-
promising on performance on benign inputs.
We observe a very peculiar phenomenon in our model:
using a standard model as a source model to perform black-
box attacks yields high success rates, whereas starting with
adversarially trained models (or reversing the source-target
direction) does not. We suspect this may be because of
some kind of decision-boundary similarities between our
model and a standard model. We plan on further investigat-
ing these observations, along with extending our sensitivity
analyses to other layers of the model, as part of future and
ongoing work.
4
Availability
Open source code for our implementation and for repro-
ducing our experiments is available at: https://github.com/
iamgroot42/sauron.
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